MESOP INSIGHT THE KURDISH DESPOTISM : The Spectre of the Dictator in the Kurdistan Regional Government

By Dr Sardar Aziz: Sardar Aziz PhD – is Senior Adviser to the Natural Resources Committee of the Kurdistan Regional Parliament and a columnist

October 12th 2015 was not an ordinary day in the Kurdistan Region. On that day the speaker of the Kurdistan parliament, Yosif Muhammad Sadiq (from the Gorran Movement), was returning from his home town Sulimanya to Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), to carry on his duties. The day before, October 11th, the speaker had been informed by the deputy speaker (from the KDP) that he should not return to the parliament. But he made the journey and he was prevented from entering the city by guards at a KDP checkpoint.

This event repesents an extraordinary violation. The KDP’s justification for blocking the speaker was the people’s demonstrations and the violent reaction to them by KDP members in many towns and cities in the Sulimanya province. The demonstrators hold the KDP responsible for the deadlock in the presidency crisis and the bad economic situation. However, the real reason was different. As a result, currently the KRG has neither a legitimate president nor a functioning government and, above all, the parliament is not carrying out its duties.

The banning of the speaker from entering the capital is linked to many deep-rooted issues haunting the politics of the KRG for the last quarter century. First, there is the position of the political parties, especially the KDP, within the political system, where the politburos are the real power-holders. Second, there’s the political imagination of the Barzani family or dynasty which cannot envisage people in top posts who are outside their narrow family circle. Third, there’s the KDP’s position vis a vis the other parties: there is clear gerrymandering and the KDP through this latest action has sent a clear message that they will not tolerate any effective political differences in the capital. The KDP has crystallised its concerns that the democratic institutions in the Kurdistan Region should not be empowered to a level that challenges the ruling elites. This was also an attempt to tame the Gorran movement. Using force to achieve these aims qualifies it as coup, par excellence.

The genesis of all this dates back to the early days of Kurdish KRG self-rule. In the early 1990s, after the uprising against Saddam’s regime, life in Iraqi Kurdistan was tough but full of hope. Today, after more than two decades of Kurdish self-rule, for the vast majority of the population, life is tougher and, more dangerously, it is hopeless. Moreover, the spectre of the dictator is lurking. In the early 1990s, the avant-garde of the region were dreaming of a Europe-like society. Back in those days, there was enthusiasm for democracy, secularism, plurality and free public space. Today all those values have either disappeared or are very weak. During more than two decades of Kurdistan politics there were many ups and downs. The region went through civil war and geographical/administrative division. These two phenomena have strongly shaped the politics of the region, and latest events have demonstrated that, in order to overcome this, the region has a long bumpy way to go. In fact what took place in the last few days showed strongly that civil war politics are still the only form of politics here.At the heart of Kurdish civil war politics there are many dark spots. One of these is that each of the two rivals, namely the PUK and KDP, desires to eradicate the other. This has evolved into the sense of an existential threat. At the end of the civil war, especially after losing Erbil (the capital) in 1996, the PUK turned out to be the weaker side and it became a party of many factions. Having lost Erbil, and unable to reform, the PUK became partners with the KDP in sharing the cake, and so the era of corruption commenced.

In this process the PUK lost the appetite to become the ruling party in the Kurdistan Region. Its defeated status by contrast made the KDP desire total control of the region. One can argue here that, in essence, neither the PUK nor the KDP were pluralist parties. The weakness of one prepared the ground for the other to take the offensive in pursuing long-dreamt plans. This might have deep roots in a amalgamation of tribal and old Soviet-style politics. When the Gorran movement emerged in 2009, the grassroots in the Kurdistan Region were ready to embrace the new political movement. This showed the level of frustration among a wide range of the population against the direction of the region’s politics. This frustration was specifically targeted toward the political elites.

The impact of Gorran’s oppositional role has been that the function of government, the role of the institutions, and the political discourse changed dramatically. Gorran is regarded as an anti-corruption, pro-transparency political movement putting civil pressure on the political elites and political structure.

After the last 2013 election, Gorran decided to become part of a broad coalition government. As the second political party in the region, Gorran headed the Regional Parliament and three ministries in the government. People had high expectations from Gorran in the government, but from the first day there were two main obstacles, internal and external.

The internal impediment was the resistance of the traditionalist parties, the KDP and PUK, toward any serious change. The external factors were the wider regional crises and decline of the oil price which has crippled the KRG. Today the region is heading in a risky direction. In contrast to the rest of the Middle East, where people are becoming increasingly active and in charge of politics, the tendency in the Kurdistan Region is toward more and more suppression and despotism. After two decades, democracy in the Kurdistan Region not only remains incomplete, but it has also grown increasingly imperilled. The idea of any real democracy remains utopian as long as the current elites are in charge.

The war against ISIS has negatively affected the civil space and the old guard are back on the scene. While the fight against ISIS ought to democratise the region more, in reality it is used to subdue and silence all criticism, and to bring about about a state of emergency and justify the rule of a strong man.

The ‘fight against ISIS’ argument is also used by the international community to neglect the desperate need for political reform in the region. Will the fight against the ISIS make the KRG more democratic or more authoritarian? If the Kurds win against ISIS but get a despotic government then they are the losers. www.mesop.de