MESOP COMMENTARY BY Hussain Abdul-Hussain – NOWMEDIA BEIRUT

Why does battling ISIS in Fallujah look bad?

1 June 2016 – Some Iraqi forces attempting to capture the city are depicting the battle in overtly sectarian terms: Battling ISIS is welcome news any day, any time. But there is something unsettling about Baghdad’s war on Fallujah. No matter how hard one tries, Fallujah looks like a Shiite war on Sunnis. Iraqi Shiites are offended over such characterization, often insisting that their war is a national Iraqi fight against the terrorists of ISIS. But visual evidence suggests otherwise.

First, whenever Baghdad’s federal government announces the liberations of areas around Fallujah, Shiite Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, aka Hashed) claim credit for victory as its media posts footage and pictures of its fighters in liberated lands.

Second, Hashed’s slogan suggests that its mission is not related to Fallujah or the eradication of ISIS. On their Facebook page, the Hashed posted a banner with the phrase: “Our Hashed will remain standing (daem), until the appearance of Qaim (the Messianic twelfth Shiite Imam Mahdi).”

Third, Hashed gives its battalions names with clear sectarian hints, such as the Imam Ali Brigade that deployed to Fallujah, Iraq’s predominantly Sunni city to the west of Baghdad.

Fourth, Hashed commences its battles on dates with Shiite connotations. For instance, the Hashed called its Fallujah campaign the “15th of Shaaban.” While seemingly marking the Islamic date of the launching of the operation against Fallujah, the date is famous amongst Shiite for being that of the birth of the Messianic Mahdi.

Fifth, if the world or Iraqis missed all these Shiite sectarian clues in Baghdad’s war on Sunni Fallujah, the Iraqi and Iranian media left no room for imagination. In the few days leading to the war, this media broadcasted footage and posted images of senior Iranian generals — such as the infamous Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) General Qassem Soleiman — sitting in what looked like war councils with Iraqi army and police officers, as well as Hashed leaders.

Sixth, throughout the rule of Saddam Hussein, many Iraqis — mostly opposition leaders who are ruling Iraqi today — complained of the olive-colored Baathist paramilitary uniform that Saddam and his lieutenants wore during the many wars that Iraq fought under his rule. Iraqis mocked Saddam for pretending to be a general, even though he had never been to a military academy. They also questioned the legal standing of the Baathist militia, at the time Iraq was supposed to depend on its regular standing army.

Like Saddam and his stooges, Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Abadi and his aides now wear an undefined black paramilitary uniform, without rank or insignia. The Iraqi constitution stipulates that the prime minister is the commander-in-chief, but it does not confer on him any military rank or give him a say in operational issues. Like the US president, the Iraqi prime minister commands the army as a politician who has the final say on waging or ending wars, but without authority over military operations or tactics.

By donning on a militia uniform, Abadi seems to be channeling both Saddam and General Soleimani, who has not been to military school despite his title. Soleimani seems to be replicating his fake military credentials across the region. All of Iran’s militias — including Hezbollah’s most veteran military leaders — have never been to military schools, but command armies at war.

On the upside, like Lebanon’s Hezbollah that softened its Islamist rhetoric in the mid-1990s in favor of a more Lebanese platform, the Iraqi Shiite Hashed now seems to be raising more Iraqi flags during its battles, as the militia dials down its provocative religious rhetoric.And like Hezbollah, whose brand of Lebanese nationalism relegates the state and elevates three unelected factions — a subdued Lebanese Army, the “people” and, “resistance” — Shiite Iraqi militias offer a similar mumble jumble of nationalism and messianic Islam. But underneath their shallow nationalism, in both Lebanon and Iraq, a Shiite message is loud and clear.

Like in Iran, militias are superior to government. In Iran, the IRGC fought a bitter war with Iraq, after which it became superior to the state and the regular army. In Lebanon, Hezbollah battled Israel, and uses whatever legitimacy it won to keep the Lebanese state inferior. In Iraq, the Hashed is “liberating” Iraqi land from ISIS, after which the Hashed will not disarm and go home, but will linger and impose its will on the Iraqi state. Clearly, in the minds of Shiites in Iran, Lebanon and Iraq, “martyrdom” trumps ballot boxes when it comes to who has the final word in any of these countries.

This is why the joy of beating ISIS in Fallujah is being spoiled by the unmistakable Shiite exploitation of this war. The ISIS militia will be hopefully eradicated, but it will be replaced by another kind of militia that has not been shy about imposing its own policies, religious emblems and rhetoric on the general population, with or without their approval. www.mesop.de