MESOP BACKGROUNDER : Providing Effective Training for the Peshmerga by Lawen Hawezy
Lawen Hawezy is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He previously served at the Council of Ministers of Iraq and as a diplomat to the United Nations.
3 Sept 2015 – FIKRA Forum – There is currently a debate among experts on how the international coalition against ISIS can provide more effective training to the Peshmerga. While some in the US government see building three US-trained brigades from the ground up—with support from the Iraq Train and Equip Fund—as the best option, others want equipment and training to go directly to units already on the front line. Since the United States is currently considering the dispatch of its first full brigade equipment set to the Peshmerga, it is important to come to an agreement on the optimal method of equipping the Peshmerga for its battle with ISIS.
The three brigades that the United States plans to establish in Kurdistan are a portion of twelve planned brigades for Iraq. The tactic of developing new brigades for Iraq is in keeping with the apparent US preference to build all-new brigades from scratch. Organizers believe that this option will better ensure the successful distribution of training and equipment. The international coalition will also be more familiar with the structure and characteristics of these new brigades than with existing non-unified Peshmerga units, which are often viewed as exclusively loyal to one of the Kurdish leaders and favoring the defense of their home areas and political strongholds to other areas. Because the United States prefers that the units it trains are able to deploy to different zones regardless of members’ political affiliation and ready to undertake defense, offense, support, and rescue missions as required for larger strategic purposes, there is some support for bypassing the existing Peshmerga structure by creating new units altogether.
On the other hand, there is little doubt about the Peshmerga’s will and capability to fight. During the past year’s clashes with ISIS, the Peshmerga has proven itself determined to defend the border. Furthermore, there have been no significant cases of Peshmerga forces refusing the instructions of their commander in chief, his deputy, or the Minister of Peshmerga, suggesting a more stable and effective chain of command than some may believe. While not wanting in determination, the existing units on the frontlines are instead suffering from a lack of arms and logistical support. This should be of considerable concern to the US government, since any breach of Peshmerga lines will allow ISIS forces to quickly advance and penetrate major cities of Kurdistan and could also prove disastrous for refugee camps close to Mosul and Kirkuk.
It is therefore important for the US military to give priority to the immediate needs of the units currently on the frontlines. Increased support will motivate them, encourage cooperation with the international coalition, and avoid fostering a feeling of neglect spurred by newly formed units under US supervision. After all, existing units contain many experienced warriors who are proud to carry on the tradition of Peshmerga. Combat experience is key, as the failure of the Iraqi Security Forces—a $25 billion US investment—shows.
The existential war on ISIS does not allow time for taking chances or trying out new approaches without maintaining the current strength of the Peshmerga fighting along the 1,200 km front with ISIS. However, the US government now has a unique opportunity to professionalize and strengthen the Peshmerga into an institution capable of adding new blood. Providing further support to the Peshmerga will help it maintain the traditional spirit of quick adjustment in order to combat any threat to Kurdistan that the force has embodied for more than six decades.
Therefore, the US government should implement a third option when considering the international coalition’s next steps: a twin-track train and equip program to empower newly formed brigades while concurrently responding to the needs of the fighting forces currently combating ISIS. An essential part of improving Peshmerga capabilities is to ensure a wide inclusion of fighters in the training programs. These programs must focus on teambuilding and providing training to entire units in order to strengthen internal unity around one leader. They must also foster intra-unit cooperation in following instructions through a clear line of command regardless of location or political leadership in the combat area. This training will craft the Peshmerga forces into a better structured force capable of pursuing clear goals with international guidance and of collaborative efforts to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS. The Peshmerga will also benefit by becoming more adept at protecting Kurdish borders against unwelcome forces and potential intrusion by neighboring countries.