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Barzani Should Embrace, Not Isolate, Rojava

Power is not the basis of a great legacy; principle is. (My  Motto: Michael Principle Ruben)

Kurdistan Question: Legacy, image, and power are important in Kurdistan. Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji and Mulla Mustafa Barzani have a positive legacy: They are remembered for rallying nationalist forces against those who would suppress Kurds as they sought to carve out independent space for the Kurds. It is a false assumption, however, to assume that image and power necessarily lead to a positive legacy.

Many Iraqi Kurdish officials savor image: They compete for the biggest house not only in Erbil, but increasingly in London and Washington as well; Masrour Barzani hosted a birthday bash for himself in a $10 million villa of which he had previously denied ownership, and the next generation Barzani brothers have also reportedly purchased multimillion dollar Washington estates recently. Too many Kurdish officials measure their importance not in jobs created or children educated, but rather in the number of cars in their convoys and how aides they have to carry their cell phones. Money becomes detached from accomplishment. President Masoud Barzani famously receives a greater salary each month than President Barack Obama does in a year, and that does not include income from the various business ventures in which Barzani appears to profit. Under his tutelage, Iraqi Kurdistan has become a region of first world hotels and restaurants and third world hospitals.

Too often, power also trumps principle. While Kurds lobby for international recognition of the Anfal as genocide, Kurdish leaders continue to ignore post-Saddam revelations that several hundred senior party members or their aides had acted as informants reporting to Iraq’s mukhabarat. Documents, for example, exposed Sadi Ahmed Pire, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)’s former head of public relations as an informant. When the going got tough, as a result of blackmail or as a desire for personal gain, too many individuals sacrificed principle for power.

The same was true during the 1994-1997 Kurdish Civil War. In 1996, against the backdrop of fighting over property and for power between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the PUK, KDP leader Masoud Barzani invited Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guards to Erbil in order to purge the city of his political rivals. Mulla Mustafa Barzani might have fought genocidal autocrats; part of Masoud’s legacy is his compromise with them. Much of the internal rivalry within the PUK boils down to prioritizing personal and family power above that of party principles. And Gorran, for its part, has yet to demonstrate that the reality of its policies will match its rhetoric of reform.

Many Kurdish authorities also embrace power to stand above the law. They wield power not to protect the people or establish the rule of law, but rather to murder journalists whose writing they dislike, or to win effective amnesty after opening fire on crowds in the street.

Despite Kurdish leadership’s own-goals over the decades, current Kurdish leaders have the opportunity to do more to construct a greater Kurdistan than any predecessor for generations. Whatever their abuses and foibles, both Barzani and ailing PUK leader Jalal Talabani deserve credit for seizing the opportunity provided them by the no-fly zone, safe haven, Saddam’s withdrawal from a larger portion of Iraqi Kurdistan and, ultimately, the U.S.-led invasion to oust the Iraqi dictator. They might still salvage legacies marked by corruption, nepotism, assassination, and complicity if they were willing to act beyond personal interests and for the benefit of greater Kurdish freedom.

Here, events in Syrian Kurdistan—Rojava—present a real test case as too what Masoud Barzani’s permanent legacy might be. What Kurdish authorities in towns like Qamisli, Amudeh, and Dirik have achieved in Syria is nothing short of amazing: They have replicated the miracle that Iraqi Kurds experienced in the early 1990s, but they have done it under constant fire and without the benefit of a no-fly zone or Operation Provide Comfort. Rather than help fellow Kurds battling Al Qaeda and living under the threat of Bashar al-Assad regime resurgence, however, Barzani has turned to blackmail: Either Syrian Kurds cede him personal power in Rojava and carve out privilege for his party, or he will blockade and undercut them. He will describe himself as a democrat, but his embrace of democracy is dependent upon himself being the sole choice.

It is in this spirit that the KRG has chosen to dig a trench to further isolate Rojava. Barzani is cementing his legacy not as a forward-thinking leader, but as a man willing to put his personal power above the good of his nation.

If Barzani truly wants to expand his influence into Syrian Kurdistan, he should reconsider his tactics. While the KDP leader might see himself as the president of Kurdistan, narrow tribalism, corruption, and the behavior of his family soil his reputation for all those who do not benefit directly from his patronage. Ordinary Kurds in Rojava juxtapose Barzani’s opulent lifestyle with the deprivation suffered by imprisoned Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan. That image is far more important than the number of Land Cruisers in a convoy. Intellectuals note that while Öcalan writes and develops political theories which Kurds might debate, Barzani has added little intellectual sustenance to the debate. It is no accident that Time Magazine named Öcalan one of the world’s most influential leaders, but omitted Barzani. While Öcalan is far from perfect, he is easily the most influential Kurdish leader today in Turkey, Syria, and perhaps even Iran. He also enjoys great respect in Sulaymani, Halabja, and areas long dominated by the PUK and now Gorran. In the broader picture, Masoud Barzani has become little more than the governor of Duhok or perhaps mayor of Sar-e Rash, while Öcalan has become the effective leader of the Kurds.

If Masoud Barzani wants to be remembered as a great leader, he must recognize that legacy is based not simply on power accumulated or familial pedigree, but rather on action and adherence to principle. He found himself as a leader in Iraqi Kurdistan not because of his own success on the battlefield, but rather because he was able to take advantage of the unexpected collapse of Saddam Hussein’s control in the wake of Operation Desert Storm and the liberation of Kuwait. Today, his Syrian brothers are seeking the same opportunity. Rather than link Kurdish freedom to the expansion of his own power, Barzani should recognize that the way to win hearts and minds is to better governance. Power is not the basis of a great legacy; principle is.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He visited Rojava earlier this year, and is a frequent visitor to Iraqi Kurdistan. Follow him on twitter @mrubin1971 http://kurdishquestion.com/component/k2/michael-rubin-s-exclusive-article-for-kurdishquestion-com-barzani-should-embrace-not-isolate-rojava.html