ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: October 2-10, 2015 Reviewing the Week

Compiled by Christopher Kozak and Daniel Pitcairn
This report is derived from open sources collected and processed at ISW during the reporting period. The report includes analysis on Russia in the Middle East, Iraq, Syria, Kurdistan, ISIS,

Key Take-Away – Russia has escalated its military actions against NATO from its new airbase in Syria. Russian warplanes have violated Turkish airspace twice, repeatedly locked Turkish F-16s in their radar, and intercepted three U.S. Predator drones over Syria. Russian warships in the Caspian Sea also launched cruise missiles against targets in Syria via Iranian and Iraqi airspace on October 7 without warning the U.S., its coalition allies, or Iraq. NATO Ministers met for a second time within a week; Secretary-General Stoltenberg reaffirmed that NATO forces are prepared to deploy to “wherever is needed” including Turkey. NATO’s response is otherwise aimed at long-term deterrence. Russia will likely continue to test the boundaries of NATO’s will to invoke Article 5 on collective defense.
 
Russia is trying to marginalize the United States by deepening its relationships with other regional states. Russian volunteers will likely support the Syrian regime and Iranian forces in their ground campaign in central Syria. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has wavered as other Iraqi Shi’a politicians and Iranian-backed proxy militias have endorsed Russian airstrikes and demanded Russian assistance. Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry publicly approved the Russian air campaign and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi telephoned Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 8 in order to help reach “political settlements to the crises in the region at the soonest possible time.” Senior Russian political and military figures also met with officials in Jordan and Israel to discuss efforts to coordinate their activities against terrorism in Syria and throughout the Middle East. Russian likely intends to lure traditional U.S. partners in the Middle East towards its alliance with Iran and Syria, undermining the position of the U.S.
 
The geopolitical struggle between Russia and the U.S. has overshadowed Afghanistan’s deteriorating security. The main Taliban faction continued its offensive in the north. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have clashed fiercely with Taliban militants in Kunduz City, which fell on September 28. General John Campbell, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, testified that security situation in the country warrants considering a residual U.S. troop contingent of three-to-five thousand after 2016 rather than the 1,000 that the White House has approved. Nonetheless, these numbers appear insufficient as Afghanistan descends into further violence while 9,800 U.S. troops remain. Russia bolstered its military forces in the capital of Tajikistan on October 7 as the Taliban’s northern offensive continued. Russia has a security agreement protecting Tajikistan, but it may also seek to assert itself in the anti-ISIS fight in Afghanistan.

RussiaMiddleEastRussia in the Middle East

 
Russia escalates confrontation with U.S. and NATO: Russia expanded its military intervention in Syria as part of a larger campaign to curb the influence of the U.S. and NATO in the region. Russian warships in the Caspian Sea launched advanced cruise missiles into Syria on October 7 in order to showcase Russia’s complete access to Iranian and Iraqi airspace. Russia launched airstrikes in support of a new ground offensive by Syrian regime and Iranian proxy forces, highlighting the level of coordination between the three countries. Russia also confronted U.S. and Turkish aircraft in an effort to intimidate the U.S. and its NATO allies. In the last week, Russian jets have intercepted U.S. predator drones flying over Syria, repeatedly violated Turkish airspace, and locked radar on Turkish fighter jets. The United States has not escalated in response to these provocations. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter said the United States would not cooperate with Moscow’s “tragically flawed” strategy. Turkish President Recep Erdogan warned Russia on October 6 against “losing a friend like Turkey,” adding that “an attack on Turkey is an attack on NATO.” NATO itself sought to deliver a warning to Russia. NATO announced that it would double the size of the NATO Response Force to 40,000 troops after its second ministerial in quick succession over the last week and asserted that its forces are ready to deploy within 48 hours to “wherever needed.”

Russia expands Syrian intervention from air to ground: Russia has rapidly and covertly expanded its intervention in Syria by launching ground operations alongside pro-regime forces, according to U.S. officials. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute reported on October 7 that Russia had built up a “battalion-size ground force” with artillery, rocket systems, and air-defense systems over the “last week or so.” Unnamed U.S. defense officials reported that Russian ground troops launched rocket and howitzer artillery in support of an October 7 pro-regime ground offensive in northern Hama Province. Secretary Carter predicted on October 8 that Russia would begin to suffer casualties in Syria after launching a “joint ground offensive with the Syrian regime.” Russia may covertly increase its troop presence on the ground in Syria by deploying a range of official and unofficial forces disguised as Russian “volunteers” in a hybrid warfare model that Russia previously employed in eastern Ukraine. Chechen governor Ramzan Kadyrov asked President Putin on October 2 to deploy Chechen security forces to Syria, echoing previous requests regarding eastern Ukraine. On October 5, the head of Russia’s parliamentary defense committee Admiral Vladimir Komoyedev said that Russian veterans of the conflict in eastern Ukraine were “likely” to deploy as “volunteer” ground troops in Syria and suggested that they “cannot be stopped.”

See: “Russian Military Activity: October 1-8, 2015,” by Hugo Spaulding, October 8, 2015; “Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 – October 7, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande, October 8, 2015; “Iraq after Russian Intervention in Syria,” by Patrick Martin, October 7, 2015; “Syrian Regime Launches Ground Offensive with Russian Air Support,” by Christopher Kozak, October 7, 2015;  “Warning Update: Russia Expanding Facilities at Tartus Naval Base,” by Christopher Kozak with Hugo Spaulding and Daniel Urchick, September 30, 2015; “Russia’s First Reported Airstrikes in Syria Assist Regime with Targeting Broader Opposition,” by ISW Research Team, September 30, 2015; “Russia Ushers in a New Era of Global Geopolitics,” Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, September 27, 2015;Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, by Maria Snegovaya, September 21, 2015; “Russian Deployment in Syria: Putin’s Middle East Game Changer,” by Hugo Spaulding, Christopher Kozak, Christopher Harmer, Daniel Urchick, Jessica Lewis-McFate, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Gambhir, and Kimberly Kagan, September 17, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Russia and Ukraine analyst Hugo Spaulding or Syria analyst Chris Kozak here.

IRAQ

 
Iranian-backed powerbrokers pressure Iraq’s Prime Minister to accept Russian airstrikes: Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is under significant pressure to accept Russian airstrikes from the Iranian government and its Iraqi proxies, which also oppose his reforms aimed at improving government efficiency and reducing corruption. Key Shi’a politicians and Iranian-backed militiamen voiced strong support for potential Russian airstrikes in Iraq. Russian officials previously stated that Moscow would consider conducting airstrikes in Iraq if Baghdad issues a formal invitation, which now seems increasingly likely. Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias, including Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Organization, voiced their support for Russian airstrikes on October 5. Other Shi’a political groups, including the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, similarly support Russian intervention. The once militia-linked chairman of the Iraqi Council of Representatives’ Security and Defense Committee suggested that Baghdad may make such a request in a matter of “days or a few weeks,” though Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Iraq has not yet requested Russian airstrikes. The visit of pro-Iran national security adviser and Popular Mobilization Commission chairman Faleh al-Fayadh to Moscow on October 7 suggests that discussions over Russian intervention by pro-Iranian elements may already be underway.
Prime Minister leverages Russian presence to gain U.S. support. PM Abadi may try to leverage the possibility of Russian assistance to convince the United States to provide more robust military support in the form of increased airstrikes, equipment, and training, though he appears open to the possibility of accepting a degree of Russia military support. Last week, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said he would “welcome” such an outcome. This week, he accused those who oppose Russian intervention of “acting as if Obama were one of their relatives.”  In addition, the Iraqi Defense Ministry’s admitted that Russia did not inform Iraq ahead of time of Russian cruise missiles flying through Iraqi airspace. This move demonstrates Russia’s willingness to act unilaterally in Iraq to thwart U.S. policy as well as Russia’s disregard for Iraqi sovereignty.
ISF advances against ISIS in Ramadi: Iraqi Security Forces aggressively advanced toward Ramadi in a bid to encircle the city that ISIS captured on May 18. The ISF failed in several previous attempts to encircle the city and hold key terrain around Ramadi. However, the Iraqi Army (IA), Counter Terrorism Services, Federal Police, and tribal fighters conducted large operations to encircle Ramadi from the north, south, and west while the U.S.-led anti-ISIS Coalition, the Iraqi Air Force, and IA Aviation conducted airstrikes following the October 4 announcement of a “large-scale military operation.” Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Gen. John Allen predicted that “Ramadi will be taken in the near future” at a meeting with Iraq’s Interior Minister in Baghdad. Recapturing Ramadi represents an essential test for Abadi, who seeks to demonstrate that Baghdad can undertake an offensive to reclaim a major ISIS-held city without relying on Iranian proxy militias that seek to undermine his reforms.
ISIS conducts terrorist attacks in nominally secure parts of Iraq: ISIS targeted Shi’a population centers to exploit the over-extension of the ISF. Between October 3 and October 5, ISIS conducted two major suicide attacks in Shi’a neighborhoods in northern Baghdad and an additional attack in Khalis, north of Baghdad. On October 5, ISIS claimed a Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attack in Zubair, south of Basra, an area where ISIS has not claimed a successful VBIED attack since July 2013. ISIS has the capacity to infiltrate and attack cities throughout Iraq, even in secure areas with predominantly Shi’a populations. Continued attacks in the southern provinces could lead to further militia mobilization, force the ISF to redeploy away from the frontlines, and slow the army’s forward operations to recapture territory from ISIS. Elsewhere in Iraq, ISIS remains in a defensive posture southwest of Kirkuk, where a Peshmerga-led offensive has seized dozens of villages since September 12 including several additional towns south of Kirkuk on October 5. Pressure on the ISIS stronghold of Hawija has not forced ISIS to divert resources towards the defense of Kirkuk, nor has it stopped ISIS from probing for exploitable weaknesses in other parts of Iraq. The deployment of additional Iraqi border guards to the Jordanian and Saudi border areas on September 29 and a subsequent operation in the region on October 9 indicates that ISIS is probing for possible access points along the Jordanian and Saudi borders with Iraq. ISW has not detected significant ISIS activity near the strategic Trebil and Arar border crossings or in the surrounding desert. However, it will be important to watch for an increase in reports of ISIS sightings near the borders that would indicate an ISIS effort to open access points between Iraq and its western neighbors.
Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Presidency crisis escalates into violence. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has experienced a political crisis since August 19 when Regional President Masoud Barzani refused to step down after the end of his term. Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the opposition parties have repeatedly failed to reach a compromise. Popular frustration with the crisis and the poor performance of government turned violent across Suleimaniyah Province after talks broke down once again. Demonstrators clashed with security forces on October 9 and October 10 in multiple towns and in downtown Suleimaniyah, leaving at least one person dead. Demonstrators also attacked KDP headquarters buildings and affiliated media offices. The demonstrations are likely spontaneous eruptions of popular discontent with the poor state of government in Iraqi Kurdistan. Leaders in the primary opposition parties, including the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran (Change), called for calm and an emergency meeting of the major political parties to resolve the crisis. The opposition will attempt to harness popular anger to extract concessions from KDP leader and Regional President Masoud Barzani in a bid to resolve the political crisis. In particular, the opposition will renew its efforts to reduce the powers of the Regional Presidency and convert the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) from a presidential system to a parliamentary one, policies that the opposition has demanded of the KDP since June 17.
 
See: “Iraqi Security Forces Launch New Offensive in Ramadi,” by Patrick Martin, October 8, 2015; “Iraq Situation Report: October 2-5, 2015“; “Iraq after Russian Intervention in Syria,” by Patrick Martin, October 7, 2015; “Confirmed Iranian Personnel Sightings in Iraq: October 2014 – October 2015,” by Andrew Haddad and ISW Iraq Team, October 3, 2015; “Warning Update: Iran and Iraqi Shi’a Militias Deploy Ground Forces in Syria,” by Christopher Kozak and Sinan Adnan, October 1, 2015; “Iraq Situation Report: September 26 – October 1, 2015“; “Iraq Situation Report: September 22-25, 2015“; “Regional Conflict Between Iran and Turky Manifests Itself in Iraq,” by Sinan Adnan, September 12, 2015; “Iraq Control of Terrain Map: September 11, 2015“; “Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iranian Proxies Challenge Iraq’s Proposed National Guard Law,” by Sinan Adnan, September 8, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq expert Patrick Martin or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.
SyriaSYRIA
 
Russia deepens its involvement in Syria: Russia expanded its intervention in Syria in both scope and scale over the past week. Russian President Putin had stated that Russian aircraft would soon “synchronize” their strikes with the Syrian Army in order to assist “offensive operations” on the ground. Russian and Syrian forces are indeed coordinating on the battlefield for the first time since the start of the Russian air campaign on September 30. Russian warplanes conducted airstrikes in support of a large-scale offensive by Syrian Army forces and Iranian proxy fighters against rebel positions in northwestern Syria. Russian forces also used ground-based multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and howitzers in support of the offensive. This offensive, located far from ISIS-held territory, further demonstrates Russia’s intent to bolster the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than defeat ISIS. Four Russian warships in the Caspian Sea launched at least 26 cruise missiles against targets in Syria as the operation commenced in a show of force to intimidate Syrian opposition factions and the U.S.-led coalition. Russia may further escalate its engagement in Syria by deploying ground personnel to active combat roles, according to a senior Russian parliamentarian. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Doug Lute stated that Russia has deployed a “battalion-sized” ground force to Syria in addition to its aircrews and support personnel.
Russia aircraft provoke U.S. and NATO allies over Syria: Russian fighter jets violated Turkish airspace along the Syrian border in two separate incidents on October 3 and 4. Warplanes and surface-to-air missile systems affiliated with either Russia or the Syrian regime also repeatedly acquired radar lock on Turkish F-16 fighter jets patrolling the border between Turkey and Syria. NATO held a ministerial meeting in response to these incidents and called upon Russia to “cease and desist” its incursions into NATO airspace. These provocative activities have also targeted U.S. aircraft flying missions against ISIS. Russian aircraft have closed to within a “handful of miles” of U.S. Predator drones operating over Syria on several occasions, according to U.S. Air Force Central Command head Lt. Gen. Charles Brown that. Russian air activity forced U.S. aircraft to take action to “maintain safe separation” between the two parties at least once in the past week, according to Pentagon spokesperson Capt. Jeff Davis. The U.S. and Russia are moving slowly towards an arrangement to de-conflict their aerial operations. Meanwhile, the deputy chiefs of staff of Russia and Israel held two days of talks in Tel Aviv to discuss the de-confliction of their own air, naval, and “electromagnetic” operations in the region.
U.S. reformulates anti-ISIS strategy as ISIS expands near Aleppo: The U.S. Department of Defense announced an “operational pause” in the train-and-equip program for moderate anti-ISIS rebel fighters after several embarrassing setbacks, including repeated targeting by Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), alleged defections, and the turnover of U.S.-provided equipment to suspected JN intermediaries. The remaining budget of the $500 million program will be devoted towards a new ‘equip-and-enable’ mission providing lethal aid to a select group of rebel factions fighting alongside the Syrian Kurdish YPG in northern Syria. The assistance will support an offensive to isolate and potentially seize the ISIS stronghold of ar-Raqqa City. Despite airstrikes by both Russia and the U.S.-led coalition, ISIS rapidly advanced at least ten kilometers into rebel-held terrain directly north of Aleppo City, threatening both rebel and regime positions in the northern Aleppo countryside. ISIS fire reportedly killed senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Hamedani near the besieged regime-held Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City. Hamedani oversaw Iranian operations in Syria since at least 2012 and his death may temporarily disrupt Iranian activities in Syria.
 
See: “Iran Loses a Key Player in its Syria Strategy,” by Marie Donovan, October 9, 2015; “Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 – October 7, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande, October 8, 2015; “Syrian Regime Launches Ground Offensive with Russian Air Support,” by Christopher Kozak, October 7, 2015; “Syrian Opposition Guide: October 7, 2015,” by Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande, October 7, 2015; “Russian Disinformation on Airstrikes in Syria,” by Genevieve Casagrande, October 3, 2015; “Warning Update: Iran and Iraqi Shi’a Militias Deploy Ground Forces in Syria,” by Christopher Kozak and Sinan Adnan, October 1, 2015; “Warning Update: Russia Expanding Facilities at Tartus Naval Base,” by Christopher Kozak with Hugo Spaulding and Daniel Urchick, September 30, 2015; “International Community’s Opinions on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” by ISW Research Team, September 30, 2015; “Russia Ushers in a New Era of Global Geopolitics,” Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, September 27, 2015; “Perspectives on the Syrian Civil War: September 27, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande, September 27, 2015; “Forecasting the Syrian Civil War,” by Christopher Kozak, Jennifer Cafarella, and the ISW Syria Team, September 17, 2015;  “Russian Deployment in Syria: Putin’s Middle East Game Changer,” by Hugo Spaulding, Christopher Kozak, Christopher Harmer, Daniel Urchick, Jessica Lewis-McFate, Jennifer Cafarella, Harleen Gambhir, and Kimberly Kagan, September 17, 2015; “Control of Terrain in Syria: September 14, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here.

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