Israel’s High Hopes for Independent Kurdistan / By Eliyahu Kamisher is a former intern for the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute.

MESOP TODAYS EXPERT VOICES ON KURDISH INDEPENDENCE

On June 20, 2014, the oil tanker SCF Atlai quietly docked in the Israeli port of Ashkelon. Although the tanker attempted to hide its presence and origins, its oil had travelled from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), through Turkey, and into the hands of a third-party shipping company that eventually transferred the oil onto the tanker. But for weeks, the Kurdish oil shipment languished in the Mediterranean Sea. None of the parties involved wanted to contravene U.S. policy, which holds that all Kurdish oil shipments must be funneled through the Iraqi government in Baghdad. Eventually Israel quietly brought the shipment into port, but the decision was less financially than politically motivated, symbolic of Israel’s new strategy toward the KRG.

The true state of Israeli-Kurdish relations is difficult to assess given its covert nature. But based on what information is public, it is clear that Israel is one of the few countries outwardly supportive of Kurdish independence. A week after the Atlai oil shipment, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued a dramatic call to “support the Kurds’ aspirations for independence,” his speech one more statement in an extensive yet ultimately unsuccessful Israeli campaign to sway U.S. policy toward supporting the KRG. These types of statements from major Israeli political figures abound, including Shimon Peres’s statement to President Obama that the Kurdish state already exists “de facto,” Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s assertion to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry that the Kurdish state is a “foregone conclusion,” and most recently Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked’s argument for an Israeli-Kurdish alliance at the annual Herzliya conference. Even so, little about the Kurdish situation has changed, calling into question what Jerusalem’s emphasis on Kurdish autonomy is expected to achieve.

While cultural affinities, a large Kurdish refugee population, and the popularity of a Kurdish state domestically perceived as moderate and secular certainly fuels Israel’s position, these factors alone cannot explain Israel’s aggressively pro-Kurdish stance. To do so, is also necessary to understand how the Israeli government envisions an autonomous Kurdistan operating in the Middle East. Netanyahu has described Kurdistan, along with other Arab states, as essential components of an “axis of regional cooperation,” designed to combat the Islamic State (ISIS). A stable, autonomous Kurdish state is essential to this plan: the state would serve as a bulwark against extremism, a bastion of stability, and an important ally dedicated to the fight against ISIS.

However, for Israel an alliance against ISIS is also an important prelude to another alliance against a more dangerous threat: Iran. While Netanyahu has dismissively characterized ISIS as a ragtag band of “militant Islamists on pickup trucks,” Israel views Iran as a formidable economic and military power interested in shifting the regional balance in its favor. Therefore, Israel is collecting as many allies as it can in the face of mounting tensions between Israel and Iran. And while the KRG is strategically important for the fight against ISIS, for Israel the Kurds’ long-term strategic importance lies in their proximity to Iran. From Israel’s perspective, the KRG and other Arab countries could occupy an important position in Israel’s strategy to rebuff Iranian influence and nuclear ambitions.

But ISIS has altered regional strategic relations in other ways, and the Erbil-Tehran relationship has visibly strengthened. Qassem Suleimani, famed leader of Iran’s elite Quds Force, has openly assisted the Kurdish Peshmerga in fending off ISIS militants and Tehran is uncharacteristically lauding its presence in Kurdistan publicly. These are all troubling developments for Israel’s dreams of an Israeli-Kurdish axis against Iran. Nor is Iran blind to how its military presence and political influence in Erbil undermines Israeli strategic interests. As one Iranian official asserted, Tehran “will never allow Netanyahu’s dreams for Iraq and our region,” a veiled hint at Israeli movements towards the KRG.

This leaves Israel in a strategic bind, since the government seems unwilling to offer military support to the KRG on the same level as Iran’s current military efforts. And although Israel wants to vocally support an independent Kurdistan in order to bolster Kurdish support, too much support could actually undermine the KRG, causing it to face increased accusations of being a state built off of the “Zionist dream.” The KRG’s reaction to Israeli support is also less than encouraging, with Kurdish officials declining to comment on Netanyahu’s vocal support for statehood.

Given these circumstances, Israel has pursued three discrete strategies to support its strategic interests and secure Kurdish independence. First, Israel is ramping up its direct economic assistance to the KRG by providing security force training, airports, communications infrastructure, and business ties. Second, Israel is lobbying the United States on behalf of the KRG, with the assumption that Kurds cannot separate from Iran’s sphere of influence without some semblance of American support. Third, Israel is one of the few nations willing to buy Kurdish oil. Despite the recent discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields in the Mediterranean, Israel continues to purchase oil from the KRG, providing essential oil revenue to a cash-strapped country. Quietly buying oil seems to be Israel’s best and most tangible means of benefiting the KRG by providing an economic boost to Kurdistan while affirming the KRG’s rights to its contested oil.

But these theoretically promising tactics may not keep up with the evolving realities of the Kurdish region. Israel’s policy of courting US interests has so far proved futile. Future success also seems unlikely, since U.S. strategic goals lean away from an independent Kurdistan and instead towards other strategically key countries that oppose Iraqi Kurdish independence, such as Turkey.

Furthermore, the impact of Israeli-Kurdish oil deals on the Kurdish economy and the Kurdish opinion of Israel are hard to assess. There are only a handful of publicly documented Kurdish oil shipments to Israel, since shipping companies use various methods to obfuscate the final destination of Kurdish oil. In 2014, documented Israeli imports of Kurdish oil totaled only 6% of the KRG’s total 34.5 million barrels of shipments not approved by Baghdad. More significantly, in December Erbil and Baghdad reached an agreement whereby the KRG can now independently export oil, so long it delivers 550,000 barrels of oil per day to the Iraqi government. The agreement allows Erbil to freely export oil to other major countries, including the United States, without economic penalty from Baghdad. And even though the accord is on the brink of collapse due to neither side fulfilling their respective commitments, the KRG has continued to increase their oil exports in the past few months. Israel’s role as an influential oil partner that has no real economic necessity for the product cannot be sustained as Kurdish exports expand into global markets.

So while Israeli politicians are courting the KRG, it seems that Kurdistan is continuing to explore alternate avenues of strategic support. While Israel’s major concern is Iran, Iraqi Kurds must toe a fine line, balancing their desire for independence, their fight against ISIS, and the competing interests of their Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish neighbors. As Israel attempts to piece together an alliance against Iran, Israel’s presumed natural allies—the KRG and the United States—are revealing themselves less concerned with Iran than Israel had hoped. And if Israel’s current policy towards Kurdistan fails to bear fruits, Israel may have to search for less expected partners, including a potentially more amicable Turkey and the many Arab states who are truly worried about Iran.