Iranian VP And Atomic Chief Salehi Reveals Details From Secret Iran-U.S. Nuclear Talks: Khamenei Made Direct Talks Conditional Upon Achieving Immediate Results; U.S. Conveyed Its Recognition Of Iran’s Enrichment Rights To Omani Sultan, Who Relayed The Message To Then-President Ahmadinejad
|
|
|
In an interview published in the daily Iran on August 4, 2015 under the title “The Black Box of the Secret Negotiations between Iran and America,” Iranian vice president and Atomic Energy Organization head Ali Akbar Salehi, who is a senior member of Iran’s negotiation team and was foreign minister under president Ahmadinejad, revealed new details on the secret bilateral talks between Iran and the U.S. that started during Ahmadinejad’s second presidential term. According to Salehi, U.S. Secretary of Energy Dr. Ernest Moniz, whom Salehi knew from his period as a doctoral student at MIT, was appointed to the American negotiation team at Salehi’s request, a request which the Americans met within hours.Salehi added that Khamenei agreed to open a direct channel of negotiations between Iran and the U.S. on the condition that the talks would yield results from the start and would not deal with any other issue, especially not with U.S.-Iran relations. Following this, Salehi demanded, via the Omani mediator Sultan Qaboos, that the U.S. recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium, and received a letter from Qaboos expressing such American recognition, which he relayed to Ahmadinejad. The following are excerpts from the interview: “A: Since the creation of the artificial [Iranian] nuclear dossier, I have been involved in all the details of this challenge, and as a former Iranian representative to the IAEA, I focused on the nuclear issue. Thus, for example, I was interviewed numerous times by international media on this issue, and wrote articles. Later I came to the Atomic Energy Organization [of Iran, AEOI], and after that to the Foreign Ministry. In light of my cumulative experience, I noticed that the members of the P5+1 seemed to not want to arrive at an outcome. In every [round of the] talks, they placed new obstacles for Iran… The other side accused Iran of not being serious in the talks, and said that [then-negotiating team leader Saeed] Jalili was raising unrelated issues and slogans at the talks, instead of negotiating. [However,] since I was knowledgeable on these matters, [I knew] that Iran was serious. Jalili was not acting on his own. There were many committees at the Supreme National Security Council, whose members were from various [Iranian] institutions and organizations, including the AEOI and the Foreign Ministry, which examined all issues. It was in this framework that Jalili was operating. “Q: Do you believe that the Iranian [negotiating] team had the will necessary to conduct and advance the negotiations? “A: Yes. Iran aspired to arrive at an outcome, but at this stage I deduced that simultaneous talks with the P5+1 were problematic, because this group does not negotiate under a single head of state. [Catherine] Ashton participated in the talks as representative of the EU, and the three European countries at the talks Britain, France, and Germany (i.e., the EU3) saw themselves as a group that was separate from America, China, and Russia. “Q: According to your description, it seems as though the talks with the P5+1 were more difficult than those with the EU3. “A: Yes. The nuclear negotiations first began with the three European countries, Britain, France, and Germany, when Rohani headed [Iran’s] Supreme National Security Council. They were later joined by the other three countries America, China, and Russia. That is, the negotiations were with America, China, and Russia + the EU3, and no country was the leader, and it was not clear which [of them] was steering the negotiation. Therefore it was decided that Ashton, and [Javier] Solana before her, would negotiate on their behalf, but actually we saw that the same problems persisted. Thus, for example, when Ashton intended to be flexible and to capitulate on a certain issue in the talks, all it took was one country’s objection [to block the move]. “In this situation, things were complicated. In effect, new obstacles were added, instead of removed, at each new round of talks, in accordance with the countries’ wishes and intentions…Then I came up with the idea that we should promote a different style [of talks]. At that time (2010-2012), when I was at the Foreign Ministry, [Hassan] Qashqavi, who was deputy foreign minister, went to Oman to deal with the issue of Iranians incarcerated abroad, because we wanted Omani assistance in obtaining the release of Iranians held in Britain and America. “Q: Why was Oman chosen as a mediator? “A: We have very good relations with Oman. When [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei referred recently to a distinguished head of state in the region, he was of course referring to the Omani ruler. Oman is respected by the West as well, and has already mediated between America and Iran, such as in the matter of the American hikers arrested in Iran… When [Deputy Foreign Minister] Qashqavi was there, an Omani official gave him a letter stating that the Americans were prepared to negotiate with Iran and were very interested in resolving this Tehran-Washington challenge. We were also willing to assist in order to facilitate the process, and it looked like this was a good opportunity. At that time, the election in America had not yet begun, but Obama had launched his reelection campaign. The Omani message came during the [Obama-Romney] election rivalry, but there was still time before the election itself. At that time, I did not take this letter seriously. “Q: Why didn’t you take it seriously? Was it because the letter came from a mid[-level] Omani official? “A: Yes. We were [concerned about] this, because the letter was handwritten and at that time I was not acquainted with the official [who had written it]. Some time later, Mr. [Mohammad] Suri, who was director of an Iranian shipping [company the National Iranian Tanker Company], visited Oman to promote issues related to shipping and to speak to Omani officials. “Q: How long after the first letter [did Suri arrive in Tehran]? “A: He came to me about a month or two after the first letter was sent, and said: ‘Mr. Salehi, I was in Oman promoting shipping matters, and an Omani official told me that the Americans were prepared to conduct bilateral secret talks on the nuclear dossier.’ It was clear that they were interested in negotiating. “Q: What exactly was the position of the Omani official whom Mr. Suri quoted? “A: It was a man named [Salem bin Nasser Al-]Ismaily, who at the time was an advisor for the Omani ruler and who still works for the Omani Foreign Ministry. He had good relations with the Americans and was trusted by Omani officials. I told Suri: ‘I am not sure how serious the Americans are, but I will give you a note. Tell them that these are our demands. Deliver it on your next visit to Oman.’ I wrote down four clear issues, one of which was official recognition of rights to [uranium] enrichment. I figured that if the Americans were sincere in their offer, then they must agree to these four demands. Mr. Suri gave this short letter to the mediator, and stressed that these were Iran’s demands. [He added that]if the Americans wished to solve this issue, they were welcome to, otherwise dealing with White House proposals would be useless and unwarranted… “All the demands in the letter were related to the nuclear challenge. These were issues we have always come against, such as closing the nuclear dossier [in the Security Council], official recognition of [Iran’s] right to enrich [uranium], and resolving the issue of Iran’s actions under the PMD [Possible Military Dimensions]. After receiving the letter, the Americans said: ‘We are certainly willing and able to easily solve the issues Iran has brought up.’ “Q: With whom was the American side in contact? “A: They were in contact with Omani officials, including the relevant functionary in the Omani regime. He was a friend of the U.S. secretary of state [John Kerry]. At that time, Kerry was not secretary of state, but head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In any case, after I received an affirmative answer from the Americans, I deduced that the ground was prepared for further steps in this direction. That is why I asked the Omanis to send an official letter to Iran so I could present it to Iranian officials. I assessed that this was a good opportunity and that we could derive benefit from it. “Q: Up to this point, you hadn’t consulted with anyone? You were acting solely on your own authority? “A: Yes. I sent a message to Omani officials saying, ‘Write your letter in an official manner so that our officials will know that it is serious.’ That was because up to that point, all discussions had been strictly oral. I told our Omani friends: ‘Present these demands officially.’ They did so, and I presented the letter to [Iranian] regime officials and went to the leader [Khamenei] to explain the process in detail. “Q: Did you also give the letter to the president [Ahmadinejad]? “A: I informed regime officials that such a letter had been received. After the letter [was received], I went to the leader and told him, ‘It is unlikely that talks between Iran and the P5+1 will achieve the results we desire. If you permit it, I can promote another path [meaning a secret bilateral channel with the U.S.].’ I later informed him that Oman was officially willing to act as official mediator. “Q: Which Omani officials signed that letter? “A: The Omani ruler did. I told the leader, ‘In light of the successful cooperation we have had with Oman, who has always tried to positively cooperate with us and has solved several issues for us in the past such as the release of Iranians held abroad then if you permit me to, I will also promote this issue with the Omani friends.’ We spoke at length on this issue. The leader presented several points and also said, ‘We cannot trust the Americans. We have a bitter experience with them following their violation of promises. They have never adhered to commitments and alliances.’ “Later I told him: ‘If you permit it, I will work on this issue to give [them] an ultimatum. We have nothing to lose in any case. We either achieve results or not. Also, these talks will be secret, and we will try to prevent them from abusing them.’ Eventually he said: ‘It is the right course of action to present an ultimatum. I do not object to this but I have a few conditions. First, the talks can only be on the nuclear issue, meaning that no bilateral relations will be discussed. Second, be vigilant so that the talks do not become a game of negotiating for the sake of negotiating, as happens with the P5+1. You will be able to deduce [whether this is the case] in the first or second meeting.’ In any case, the leader generally agreed to talks and said ‘go advance this issue.’ “At that time there were disagreements in Iran, with each member having his own specific opinion. These disagreements posed a problem. In fact, the leader was my only supporter, but I did not want to trouble him with the minutia if this problem. I received his permission to negotiate and told the Omani side we were prepared to talk. The Americans also insisted that these talks be secret. Later I began to try and coordinate between the relevant domestic institutions but due to the disagreements, I ran into problems trying to advance the issue. “Q: Did the Supreme National Security Council play a part in these [secret] talks? “A: No. I was authorized to advance these talks but I had to coordinate with the other bodies, which is exactly what caused problems. Eventually, after receiving the leader’s approval, eight months after the necessary coordination was achieved with the head of the Supreme National Security Council [Saeed Jalili], the first meeting with the Americans was held. We sent a team to Oman that included the deputy foreign minister for European and American affairs, Mr. [Ali Asghar] Khaji, as well as several CEOs. The Americans were surprised in the first meeting and said, ‘We cannot believe this is happening. We thought Oman was joking. We aren’t even prepared for these talks with you.’ “Q: What was the level of the team that the Americans dispatched? “A: It included Assistant Secretary of State William Burns. They said: ‘We only came to see if Iran was truly willing to negotiate.’ Our representative gave them the required response and eventually there were talks on this issue. The initial result was achieved and the ground was prepared for further coordination. “Q: How were the Americans convinced that the Iranian diplomats who were dispatched had the necessary authority? “A: [Until] that phase, Iran and America had not been allowed to sit opposite each other at the negotiating table. The fact that Iran had sent a deputy foreign minister to the talks indicated its seriousness. The Americans also noticed how seriously [Iran was taking] the issue. At that meeting, Khaji pressed the Americans to set up a roadmap for the negotiations, and eventually the talks of a roadmap were postponed to the second meeting. At the second meeting, Khaji warned the Americans: ‘We did not come here for lengthy negotiations. If you are serious, you must officially recognize enrichment, otherwise we cannot enter into bilateral talks. But if you officially recognize enrichment, then we too are serious and willing to meet your concerns on the nuclear matter as part of international regulations.’ “Q: What [Iranian] body backed this demand? “A: The Foreign Ministry, since the leader gave me guidelines [as foreign minister] and stressed, ‘First you must promote important demands such as official recognition of enrichment rights.’ We determined that this issue would be a criterion [for determining whether the talks would continue]. We told ourselves that if they postponed recognition of enrichment to the final stage [of the talks], they would turn out to be unserious and these talks would be fruitless. “Q: When you presented the results of the first meeting to Iranian officials, what did those who opposed the talks say? “A: They said that the negotiations were useless and that the Americans were unserious in promoting official recognition of Iran’s rights. “Q: You have said that the negotiations started during Obama’s first term. Did you consider the possibility that Obama’s rival would be elected president and would reject Obama’s reassessment of Iran, and that the White House would continue the same inflexible hostility? “A: No, on the contrary, [although] at that time the race between Obama and Romney was very close, [and] in some polls Romney was even ahead of Obama. [But] the Americans intended to push for good terms in the negotiations with all possible speed. In fact, there was a good atmosphere for talks. This was while I was dealing in Iran [with the issue of] dispatching our representatives to Oman, because I did not want to make any moves without coordinating with other [regime] bodies. Eventually there were many obstacles in Iran [created by opponents to the negotiation], and [then] the American elections came about, and the American negotiating team said: ‘We are postponing the talks due to the elections so that we can see the results.’ Thus, we lost our chance.” http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/8707.htm |