How will Assad React to a U.S. Strike? Strategies to Mitigate Unintended Consequences
Atef al-Souri – September 7, 2013 – FIKRA FORUM – With the approach of a possible strike on Syria – assuming that the U.S. Congress approves – it becomes necessary for one to think about what President Assad’s reaction will be, and what possibilities are available to him.
The problem that the U.S. has with Assad is his [relatively] weak military and reckless behavior. Any powerful U.S. military strike could eliminate the regime and bring along with it chaos. [This is the reason why] the [Obama administration] is trying to avoid a military strike, or at the least undertake a very limited and small strike that would not have too much of an impact on the Assad regime. However, such a response would make Assad a hero to his supporters and weaken the U.S. administration’s position, as well as causing it to lose much of its influence over any future political settlement.
On the international level, Russia is not prepared to wage a war with the United States over Syria. However, with the goal of embarrassing the U.S. administration and testing weapons, it could send advanced weapons to Syria in small amounts with the intention of using them during the approaching strike. As for Iran, it is concerned primarily with its nuclear program and the upcoming talks, as well as its new president, Hassan Rouhani, who has an ambitious economic program to help reincorporate Iran into the international community. Therefore, Iran’s response will likely be angry statements, threats to the West, and messages of support to the regime, bearing in mind that Iran has offered so much to Assad over the past two years.
I do not expect Hezbollah to take any specific action. On the one hand, Hezbollah is connected to Iran, which wants to maintain it as a deterrent force to protect its nuclear program. It will not risk Hezbollah being destroyed in a war that the Americans say is not intended to change the regime. However, that does not ensure the absence of limited and violent clashes on the Lebanon-Israel border to give legitimacy to its military arsenal among Lebanese, including Shiites.
The Assad regime is not capable of a military response against U.S. forces, but will try to do its best to demonstrate the failure of the U.S. administration in achieving its goals by creating some of the consequences that the U.S. fears the most. For example:
– The regime could withdraw forces from regions where groups associated with al-Qaeda could gain control, and then use the media and foreign journalists to cover the issue to make it appear as though al-Qaeda and the U.S. are partners.
– The regime could withdraw from Alawite villages in Sunni areas—in Hama or Homs, for example — to trigger massacres and killings of Alawites and say that the American strike led to the killing of minorities.
– One cannot disregard the fact that the regime would use rockets to kill civilians and then place the blame on the U.S., bringing to mind the American invasion of Iraq.
– Assad knows that Israel is a red-line for the United States and realizes that the U.S. does not want to get involved in a new conflict. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that Assad might bomb Israeli settlements in the occupied Golan Heights with several rockets without retaliation by the international community or Israel. At the same time, he would frame the U.S. action as a strike against the rejectionist forces toward Israel (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, etc.), a service to Zionist ambitions at the expense of the Palestinian issue, rather than a punishment against him for using internationally prohibited weapons against his people. The same thing could happen in Jordan. He could continue to increase the amount of refugees, target border regions, and possibly send car bombs to indirectly threaten its stability.
Aside from specific Syrian regime reactions, fear in areas that the U.S. might bomb could contribute to the displacement of large numbers of civilians to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, thus increasing the economic, security, and social pressures on these countries.
In the event that the regime undertakes any of the above mentioned strategies, the United States could take several steps to ensure the Assad regime’s failure.
– Direct military support in areas that the U.S. believes will be liberated because the regime is incapable of using airpower against the opposition, especially in Idlib, Aleppo, Deir al-Zour, and Daraa, so that any secondary force would be hesitant in fighting the Free Syrian Army (FSA) because of its weapons and American support. Liberation of these territories would represent a true victory for the Syrian revolution and the U.S. administration, as well as changing the balance of power.
– The United States should take advantage of the people it has funded and trained in telecommunications and media technology and equipped with cameras and other technology. They are widely distributed throughout Syria and by utilizing them to try to cover any crime that the regime commits in attempts to blame U.S. forces, the U.S. could counteract those allegations with real evidence.
– The U.S. could work to stop Syrian state broadcasting services, as well as local or neighboring outlets which espouse the Syrian regime position.
– The FSA must continue to encourage defection from the regime army, and guarantee the protection of any defectors.
– The FSA must release a statement saying that the U.S. strike is aimed at Assad’s forces and not civilians or the country’s infrastructure, and that the reason for such a strike is Assad’s brutal actions toward his people.
– The United States must reassure Syrians that all targets are military targets, and that the strike would prevent the regime from using chemical weapons. It must also assure Syrians that it will not attack residential areas.
– It would be preferable that Jordan not allow Syrians to leave refugee camps during the U.S. strike.
– The U.S. government should exert pressure on Hezbollah via the Lebanese government to stop Hezbollah from starting a war with Israel for the sake of a failed Syrian state in which all of Lebanon would pay the price.
– It is necessary to target military bases in Latakiya and the Western coast to weaken the morale of Assad’s supporters, and convince them that Assad cannot provide them any protection or guarantees.
Of all the steps, the optimal solution is to not carry out any military operation, and continue to work – particularly during the G20 summit – with Russia toward a peaceful solution to the Syrian conflict, according to the proposed Geneva agreement, and consistent with the American understanding of Assad’s removal. The solution should also be accompanied by Iranian and Gulf States’ mutual understanding. At this point, a small-scale U.S. military strike may be necessary with the strategic intention of sending a message to Assad that it has been internationally and popularly agreed upon that his rule is over.
*Atef al-Souri is a pseudonym used by the author for security reasons.