Trump is already working his Arab strategy for Syria. He reminded his followers via a tweet Dec. 24 that Saudi Arabia has agreed to help fund Syria’s reconstruction. Syria will be on the agenda when US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visits Saudi Arabia, as well as the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain this month.
As the Gulf states reconsider their relations with Damascus and Syria’s return to the Arab League, and as the United States looks to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf to finance Syrian reconstruction, a question will emerge regarding US and multilateral sanctions. Next week the US Senate will consider bipartisan sanctions legislation on Syria. More sanctions, however, could constrain regional and international efforts to support a Syrian transition and the country’s reconstruction, including initiatives of the United Nations and the World Bank. As it is with Iran, the United States could find itself boxed in, seeking exceptions to its own sanctions policies to allow allies to fund reconstruction.
The pitfalls of an Erdogan-first strategy in Syria are already showing. US national security adviser John Bolton said in Jerusalem on Jan. 6 that the withdrawal of US troops in Syria will not just be conditioned on defeat of IS and the safety of US forces as they pull out, but also on Turkey’s assurances that it will not attack Syrian Kurdish fighters who have been partners in the campaign to defeat IS.
Bolton’s remarks followed a blistering Turkish reaction to Pompeo’s comment Jan. 3 about “the importance of ensuring that the Turks don’t slaughter the Kurds.”
“Turkey is determined to continue its fight against PKK/PYD/YPG and DAESH terrorist organizations which pose existential threat to its national security and target the political unity and territorial integrity of Syria,” the statement read; the PKK is the Kurdistan Workers Party outlawed by Turkey, while DAESH is the Arabic acronym for IS. “Misrepresenting Turkey’s fight against a terrorist organization as an attempt to target a particular group in Syria is totally unacceptable, given that Turkey embraces the entire Syrian people, including Kurds. We strongly condemn treating a terrorist organization as a partner in fighting DAESH.”
Idiz writes, “The concern on the Turkish side is that what Ankara considers to be a legitimate fight against terrorism will be transformed in Western minds into another case of Turkey attacking long-suffering Kurds.”
Turkey considers the YPG, which is the armed wing of the PYD and which makes up the bulk of the US aligned Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as directly linked to the PKK, which both Ankara and Washington consider a terrorist organization. “For Russia, the entire approach to the dealings with Erdogan was not so much about driving wedges between Turkey and the United States as about offering sets of incentives powerful enough to make Ankara want to cling to Moscow rather than Washington,” adds Suchkov. “Russian President Vladimir Putin personally has been meticulously working on this policy for a long while.”
“On the other hand, Turkey has been skillful enough to play both Russia and the United States to extract the best possible deals for Ankara’s own interests,” Suchkov continues. “The stress test of the downed Russian jet in late 2015, however, made Erdogan more cautious not to overplay his cards with Putin. Moscow and Ankara have since been more prudent when walking on each other’s terrain. The current state of affairs in Syria makes this experience particularly helpful. Russia shows empathy for Turkey’s fundamental security concern about the YPG and other Kurdish forces. Turkey, in turn, has to side with the Russian agenda on preserving Syrian territorial integrity and on Assad as being ruler of the country — at least for now.”
Just as is the case in US-Turkish relations, however, a “problem is that Ankara and Moscow do not agree on who counts as a terrorist in Syria,” adds Idiz.
Fehim Tastekin, explaining the differences among Turkish civilian and military leaders about a military operation in eastern Syria, adds, “Russia is trying to persuade Ankara to give up its operational plans and promises a different type of buffer: Deploying the Syrian army to Manbij and east of the Euphrates. According to the Russian thinking, when the Syrian army comes, the YPG’s control will end. The Syrian regime also says it will dispatch troops to the region only when the YPG withdraws.”
“Turkey,” Tastekin continues, “suspects the Kurds will devise a formula to remain in the area or under the protection of the Syrian army. While Turkey is struggling between the US and Russian plans, another element makes the issue even more complex: Washington wants to deploy Saudi, UAE and Egyptian troops in the region, hardly friendly forces to Turkey. The plan has already made Turkish officials nervous.”
“Adding to Ankara’s complications,” reports Idiz, “the situation in Idlib is showing signs of getting out of hand. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed in Sochi in September to secure a cease-fire in Idlib and establish buffer zones in the province between regime forces and Turkish-supported FSA elements. Under the accord, Turkey is also responsible for disarming groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and expelling its fighters from the province.
“Moscow has said on more than one recent occasion that these objectives have not been met yet,” Idiz continues. “It has, nevertheless, been careful to compliment Ankara’s efforts in this regard so not to sully the positive atmosphere between the two countries. There are also reports that the Syrian army has resumed shelling specific targets in Idlib, raising the specter again of an operation by Russian and regime forces on the province that would undermine Ankara’s plans.”
“Many in Ankara suggest that the Trump decision further reinforces Russia’s role as a dealmaker in Syria and that all roads involving the situation in Idlib and the east of the Euphrates now lead to the Kremlin,” writes Suchkov. |