MESOP NEWS : TODAYS ANALYSIS – Principles to Guide U.S. Military Engagement in the Middle East
January 31, 2017 | James Jeffrey and Michael Eisenstadt – The Newsletter
James Jeffrey – Former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey – Michael Eisenstadt – Director, Military and Security Studies Program, Washington Institute
Some of the most significant challenges the Trump administration will face are in the Middle East. These include the threat of salafi-Jihadist terrorism, Iran’s efforts to create a “Shiite crescent” spanning the region, and a resurgent Russian role. In the Middle East, President Donald Trump, like his last five predecessors, will be a wartime president—whether he wants to or not.Many consider the results of America’s military engagement in the broader Middle East over the past four decades to be incommensurate to the nation’s sacrifice. Particularly since 9/11, many Americans have grown frustrated with their nation’s involvement in the Middle East’s “forever wars.”
Yet, the United States still has vital interests in the region that require it to remain engaged there. These interests have changed little over 40 years and include: combating extremist terror; preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction; facilitating the export of oil—upon which global oil prices and the economies of America’s major trade partners are dependent; and ensuring the security of key partners and allies.
Moreover, the United States has learned in recent years that what happens in the Middle East doesn’t stay in the Middle East. This export of the region’s systemic problems can have significant implications for vital American interests.
While domestic concern over recent military operations is understandable, the fact is that since World War II, U.S. military activities and operations in the Middle East deterred Soviet intervention throughout the Cold War; helped protect Jordan from Syrian aggression and cement Egypt’s transformation into a U.S. ally in the 1970s; prevented an Iranian victory during its war with Iraq in the 1980s; and reversed the invasion of Kuwait and contained Iraq in the 1990s. Currently, U.S. military force plays a central role in rolling back the Islamic State. Given these past achievements and enduring vital U.S. interests in the region, it is essential that the U.S. maintain its active military posture in the Middle East to fulfill critical missions there: preventing the spread of instability; defeating ISIS and pursuing terrorists throughout the region; containing an emboldened Iran; and countering a renewed, assertive Russian presence. More generally, American forces back up U.S. diplomacy to preserve and expand regional cooperative security with our partners, prevent any power from establishing a dominant regional sphere of influence, deter or defeat aggression, and prevent the spread of disorder to areas of the region still at peace.
But the United States should learn from the policy lapses of the last two administrations about how best to employ the military. It should neither rely too heavily on the military instrument when a whole of government approach is needed, nor should it rule out the use of the military instrument when it can advance U.S. interests. Only by such a balanced approach can the sustained support of the American people—the most important component of any U.S. strategy—be assured. The following are more specific principles to these ends.
Geostrategic Principles
Most of America’s military interventions in the region during the Cold War and immediately thereafter (Tanker War, Kuwait, no-fly zones over Iraq) employed conventional forces to achieve traditional military missions: to deter adversaries or defeat enemy forces. By contrast, most of America’s interventions since 9/11 have employed conventional and unconventional forces to accomplish complex, political-military missions: counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and state building. It is inappropriate, however, to expect the military to be able on its own to translate its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency achievements into sustainable political outcomes or to saddle it with state-building missions.
Going forward, success will require a better understanding of what U.S. military force can accomplish and what it cannot. Many of the current military threats encountered in the region spring from deep-seated social and religious tensions and underlying political dysfunctions. This leads to several specific principles to guide military action: First, any military effort must recognize these tensions and dysfunctions, and ensure that American actions do not exacerbate them, as U.S. policies since 9/11 have so often done.
Second, it is unrealistic to expect that U.S. or coalition forces can resolve these tensions or dysfunctions in the near-term. Intelligent use of the military can, however, mitigate tensions, deter conflicts, and respond effectively to violent manifestations.
Third, more force is not always better. Overwhelming American power brought about the collapse, rather than the defeat of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), with former regime elements in both countries returning as insurgents. By contrast, a small but focused Russian military intervention has altered the balance of forces in western Syria—at least for now—yielding a number of short-term benefits for Russia and its Syrian and Iranian clients (albeit by using scorched-earth tactics the U.S. would never find acceptable). There is a lesson here regarding the potential benefits of the limited use of force in certain circumstances.Given the region’s current chaos, the U.S. should have modest expectations of what its military interventions can achieve. While stability operations may sometimes be necessary, the military should not be assigned responsibility for state-building. But it can shape developments in the region—encouraging positive trends, and deterring or disrupting negative developments. The key is identifying achievable ends, and devoting appropriate and sufficient means to the task.
Military Principles
The foregoing argues for a “light footprint” military approach for the region—to ensure that America’s commitments do not involve unsustainable investments of blood and treasure, and do not adversely affect readiness in other theaters. Military presence, train and equip efforts, advisory teams, more responsive Foreign Military Sales mechanisms, coalition building, intelligence collection and sharing, better coordination with coalition members and local partners, and direct action— primarily by Special Forces and airpower—will normally be the preferred military options.
But to deter adversaries and assure partners, the U.S. must maintain significant conventional forces in or available to the region. America should not telegraph its intentions to its enemies; accordingly, no military option, including major ground operations, should be taken off the table. If the United States is considering going beyond the use of Special Forces and air power, its readiness for greater intervention should generally be contingent on leveraging the involvement of others, including credible local partners. Furthermore, missions assigned to military forces should be ones they can accomplish; the military cannot be expected to achieve on its own some broader political purpose. And policymakers have an obligation to ensure any military intervention is adequately resourced and sufficiently supported by the American people.
Geopolitical missteps in dealing with complex political conflicts cannot be remedied by high-tech solutions, tactical virtuosity, or arms transfers. The military can be effective only if used to implement policies based on an accurate reading of Middle Eastern political and cultural realities, and sound geopolitical judgment. Only in this way, will the U.S. secure its interests in this still vital part of the world. These are the principal lessons of America’s military engagement of the Middle East since 9/11. We hope they will guide the Trump administration as it goes forward.