MESOP : ISW INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY: October 17-23, 2015 Reviewing the Week -Compiled by Christopher Kozak & Daniel Pitcairn

 The report includes analysis on Iraq, Syria, ISIS, Kurdistan.

Key Take-Away –Russian President Vladimir Putin leveraged his role as a pivotal powerbroker in the Syrian Civil War to shape negotiations over a political transition in Syria, hosting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Moscow on October 20. Putin subsequently held telephone conversations with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan in advance of an October 23rd meeting on the conflict in which Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. participated. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called for including in the talks Egypt and Iran, two regional powers with increasingly close relations with Moscow. Russia later announced the formation of a “working mechanism” with Jordan to coordinate military activities in Syria and used the existence of this new mechanism to lobby the U.S. to partner with Russia and provide air support to “moderate” rebels against ISIS. Russia paired its diplomacy with continued efforts to set favorable conditions on the ground in Syria. Russia is supporting significant advances by joint regime-Iranian forces near Aleppo City through airstrikes likely coordinated by Russian special forces, recently confirmed to have been deployed to Syria. Russia and the U.S. also concluded a memorandum of understanding on basic safety measures for air operations in Syria, reflecting tacit U.S. acceptance of the Russian intervention in Syria. The U.S. and its allies appear increasingly willing to compromise with Russia on the short-term future of President Assad. Nine countries including Turkey and the U.S. have reportedly agreed upon an initial proposal for Assad to serve as “symbolic president” of a “transitional administration” in Syria on the condition of guarantees for his subsequent departure after six months.
The U.S. attempted to reestablish its position as a guarantor of regional security against ISIS. U.S. Special Forces advised and assisted a raid by Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga that freed seventy hostages from an ISIS prison in northern Iraq. One U.S. service member died of wounds sustained during the operation, marking the first U.S. combat casualty of Operation Inherent Resolve. The successful raid emphasizes the unique capabilities provided by U.S. forces in Iraq amidst continued pressure on Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi to request Russian airstrikes. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford warned the Iraqi Defense Minister that Russian airstrikes would hinder continued U.S. military support to Iraq during his official visit to Arbil and Baghdad. Nonetheless, the successful capture of Baiji City and the adjacent Baiji Oil Refinery in northern Iraq by a force composed primarily of Iranian proxy militias will temper U.S. efforts to present itself as Iraq’s indispensable partner against ISIS. Preparations also continued for a U.S.-backed offensive by Syrian Kurdish and moderate rebel forces against the ISIS stronghold of ar-Raqqa City in northern Syria. ISIS reportedly instituted conscription in towns throughout ar-Raqqa Province in anticipation of an imminent attack.

  
RussiaMiddleEastRussia in the Middle East
Russia positioned itself as a powerbroker in Syria amidst great-power negotiations over a political transition. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad traveled to Moscow to discuss proposals for a political transition in Syria with Russian President Vladmir Putin, who stated that Russia aimed to set the conditions for a political settlement in Syria through military action. Putin later called the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, but content of these discussions is not publicly known. Russia thereby signaled its role as a mediator before scheduled four-party talks with the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in Vienna on October 23, which concluded without reaching a consensus. All parties agreed to a follow-on meeting with the participation of additional unspecified countries, possibly as early as October 30. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov called for the participation of Iran, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in the next round of talks. Kerry stated that the U.S. is not prepared to include Iran in discussions “at this point in time.” Lavrov’s call to include Iran ignored the assertion by Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir earlier this week that Iran must withdraw its military forces from Syria before it can participate in peace talks.
 
Russia is taking military action in Syria to influence a political settlement. Russia deployed a small group of special forces, said to be comparable to the U.S. Delta Force, from separatist-held eastern Ukraine to Syria, according to an unnamed Russian defense official. The timing of this deployment is unclear, but likely occurred in recent weeks. Elite Russian troops, possibly the same special forces, are coordinating Syrian ground forces with Russia’s air campaign, according to an unnamed U.S. defense official. This coordination is likely occurring in Aleppo, where regime and Iranian ground forces launched a major operation supported by Russian airstrikes on October 15. These combined forces advanced into rebel-held territory south of Aleppo City and ISIS-held territory near the besieged Kuweires Airbase east of Aleppo City in simultaneous offensives. These maneuvers likely seek to set conditions for a subsequent offensive to isolate rebel forces in Aleppo City while blocking an ISIS counterattack against the regime’s eastern flank. A successful operation to seize or isolate rebel-held portions Aleppo City would deal a powerful symbolic blow to the Syrian opposition and place the Syrian regime and its allies in a position of strength during negotiations regarding a political transition. Russia meanwhile reportedly suffered its first casualties in the Syrian Civil War on with the alleged deaths of at least three Russian fighters, possibly “volunteer” forces on October 19, in Latakia Province.
Russia moved to corner the U.S. and its regional allies into a partnership against ISIS in Syria as a component of the negotiations. Russia and Jordan established a coordination cell in Amman, Jordan on October 23 to help “coordinate” Russian and Jordanian airstrikes against ISIS on a “daily” basis. Lavrov stated that Russia was prepared to provide air support to Syria’s “patriotic opposition,” including the Free Syrian Army (FSA), against ISIS. Unconfirmed reports indicate Russia agreed not to strike moderate rebel forces in southern Syria, which are supported by the U.S. and Jordan. Lavrov invited the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to participate in the new coordination cell and called on the U.S. to share information regarding the location of FSA units, which the U.S. has refused to do. Lavrov also called for talks between Assad and the “full spectrum” of the Syrian opposition despite past rhetoric that described all opposition fighters as terrorists. These statements underscore Russia’s use of disinformation to disguise itself as a cooperative actor while pursuing a political settlement on its own terms through military force.Russia continues to conduct airstrikes against the Free Syrian Army among other non-ISIS targets in Syria while it campaigns to forge an alternative counterterrorism coalition in the region at the expense of the U.S.
Russia continued to pursue deeper partnerships in the Middle East to compete with the U.S. as a leader in regional security. Russia agreed to host a senior Iranian military delegation to discuss bilateral military cooperation for 2016, a signal of its intent to bolster its strategic partnership with Tehran. Russia’s ambassador to Iraq called for greater military cooperation with Baghdad while President Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff reported that Russia planned to sell Egypt $1 billion-worth of helicopters and equipment for Egypt’s new Mistral-class helicopter carriers. Russia’s aspiration to outfit the carriers demonstrates that the Kremlin not only views Egypt as a potential regional partner to draw out of the U.S. orbit but also a conduit to circumvent U.S. and EU sanctions over Ukraine.
 
See: “Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 – October 22, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola, October 21, 2015; “Russian Military Activity: October 14-21, 2015,” by Hugo Spaulding, October 21, 2015; “Joint Syrian-Iranian-Russian Offensive Achieves Only Limited Initial Gains,” by Christopher Kozak, October 14, 2015; “Iraq after Russian Intervention in Syria,” by Patrick Martin, October 7, 2015; “Syrian Regime Launches Ground Offensive with Russian Air Support,” by Christopher Kozak, October 7, 2015; Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, by Maria Snegovaya, September 21, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Russia and Ukraine analyst Hugo Spaulding or Syria analyst Chris Kozak here.
SyriaSYRIA
A new air safety agreement between the U.S. and Russia lowers the risk of escalation over Syrian airspace but fails to reassure Turkey. Russia and the U.S. signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on air safety in Syria on October 20. The memorandum follows a series of aggressive Russian maneuvers against U.S. aircraft and violations of Turkish airspace. The air safety agreement does not apply to Turkish airspace violations. The agreement also does not specify the distance Russian planes are required to maintain, according to “a U.S. official with direct knowledge of the U.S.-Russia agreement.” Russia subsequently announced that its planes would carry out airstrikes “independently,” suggesting that Su-30 air superiority fighters would no longer escort Russian bombers. The U.S. Department of Defense emphasized that a memorandum of understanding on air safety procedures signed by Russia and the U.S. on October 20 does not “constitute U.S. cooperation or support for Russian policy or actions in Syria.” The limited nature of the MOU indicates that the agreement will not prevent Russia from continuing to confront the U.S.-led coalition or demonstrate its freedom of action in Syria. The U.S. continued to strike al-Qaeda targets in Syria in airspace used by Russian pilots. A U.S. airstrike west of Aleppo City killed Sanafi al-Nasr, a senior al-Qaeda operative and leader of the JN-linked ‘Khorasan Group’ on October 15. The Pentagon noted that Nasr is the fifth senior ‘Khorasan Group’ member killed in the past four months in a statement confirming Nasr’s death. The U.S. meanwhile deployed 12 A-10 ‘Warthog’ ground attack aircraft to Incirlik Airbase in southern Turkey in order to replace six F-16 fighter jets in a pre-planned rotation. Meanwhile, Canada announced on October 21 in the wake of its elections that it will withdraw its six fighter jets from the air campaign in Iraq and Syria, a symbolic setback to the counter-ISIS mission.
 
See: “Update: International Community’s Position on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” by Christopher Kozak, October 24, 2015. “Regime and Iranian Officials Launch Multi-Pronged Offensive in Aleppo,” by Christopher Kozak, October 21, 2015; “Russian Airstrikes in Syria: September 30 – October 20, 2015,” by Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola, October 21, 2015; “Joint Syrian-Iranian-Russian Offensive Achieves Only Limited Initial Gains,” by Christopher Kozak, October 14, 2015; “Iran Loses a Key Player in its Syria Strategy,” by Marie Donovan, October 9, 2015; “Syrian Regime Launches Ground Offensive with Russian Air Support,” by Christopher Kozak, October 7, 2015; “Syrian Opposition Guide: October 7, 2015,” by Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande, October 7, 2015; “Warning Update: Iran and Iraqi Shi’a Militias Deploy Ground Forces in Syria,” by Christopher Kozak and Sinan Adnan, October 1, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Syria analysts Jennifer Cafarella or Chris Kozak here.
IraqIRAQ
U.S. Special Forces, using advise and assist authorities, participated in a ground operation against ISIS in Iraq. U.S. Special Operations Forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga commandos they advised freed 70 hostages from an ISIS prison ina village near the ISIS stronghold of Hawija, southeast of Kirkuk city. One U.S. service member was killed during the operation, marking the first U.S. combat casualty in Iraq since December 2011. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) requested the raid, highlighting the increasingly close military cooperation between the United States and Kurdish Peshmerga. This close coordination could generate additional friction with the Iraqi Government.  The U.S. has confirmed that it informed the Iraqi government in advance, contradicting the claim of a spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD). Nonetheless, the raid sends a strong signal to the Iraqi government that Iraq’s partnership with the U.S. is more valuable than potential Russian support. The raid demonstrated how American logistical, intelligence, and military assistance can serve as a force multiplier in future operations in Iraq. The leader of the Sunni Etihad bloc Osama al-Nujaifi still thanked the U.S. for participating in the operation. The operation comes just days after Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford traveled to Arbil and Baghdad amid concerns regarding the threat of increased Russian-Iraqi military cooperation.Gen. Dunford told the Iraqi defense minister that Russian airstrikes in Iraq would make it difficult for the U.S.-led coalition to continue supporting Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the same capacity. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi told Gen. Dunford that he had not requested Russian airstrikes and has no plans to do so. Future operations by U.S. special forces in Iraq could provoke Iranian proxy militias in Iraq to consider attacking U.S. assets. Iranian proxy militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (designated terrorist and leader of Iranian proxy militia Kataib Hezbollah), and Sadrist Trend leader Muqtada al-Sadr denounced the operation as an infringement on Iraqi sovereignty. These groups maintain their threat to retaliate against U.S. assets if the U.S. crosses a “red line” in Iraq, which may include the participation of U.S. forces in combat operations.
Iraq’s Council of Ministers unanimously approved a constrained 2016 budget. The sharp decline in the price of oil will constrain the 2016 federal budget, which has passed to the Council of Representatives (CoR) for final approval. The budget will allocate funding for the security forces and government salaries as well as various militias of the “Popular Mobilization,” many of which also receive financial, technical, and military support from Iran. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, an Iranian-linked militia leader and a U.S.-designated terrorist, wrote an open letter to Prime Minister Abadi complaining that the budget allocation for the “Popular Mobilization” was “meager” and had decreased from the previous budget, which allocated over one billion USD to the “Popular Mobilization.” Muhandis himself is a key official in the government  commission charged with managing and distributing the resources allocated to the “Popular Mobilization,” which secures the influence of Iranian proxies over the “Popular Mobilization.” Some Iraqi politicians believe that an increase in funding could give Baghdad increased leverage over the popular mobilization. This is highly unlikely, however, as there are few mechanisms for government control over the “Popular Mobilization.” The 2016 budget is also set to cut wages for government workers, a move that could trigger civil unrest since at least 40 percent of the population works for the government. Resistance against a funding cut for various ministries is likely, as political parties often use ministerial budgets to distribute patronage and increase their political influence.
Major gains by Iranian-backed militias in Baiji overshadow limited ISF gains in Ramadi. ISF and Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias recaptured Baiji city and the Baiji oil refinery, Iraq’s largest oil facility and a strategic position along the Baghdad-Mosul highway. The gains are a stark contrast to the limited progress of the ongoing ISF operation in Ramadi backed by the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition. The decisive victory by the Iranian proxy militias in Baiji supports the narrative that these militias are an invaluable component of Iraq’s war against ISIS. These forces may now redeploy to the towns of Hawija and Sharqat, north of Baiji, and Fallujah, which has been held by ISIS since January 2014. The militia victory in Baiji places additional pressure on Prime Minister Abadi to rely on Russia, Iran, and its proxy fighters for future operations. Prime Minister Abadi must succeed in recapturing Ramadi quickly to demonstrate the ISF’s capacity to fight ISIS without proxy militia support and to limit the influence of Iran and Russia.
See: “Iraq Situation Report: October 16-20, 2015“; “Political Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan Escalates into Violence,” by Patrick Martin, October 12, 2015; “Iraqi Security Forces Launch New Offensive in Ramadi,” by Patrick Martin, October 8, 2015; “Iraq after Russian Intervention in Syria,” by Patrick Martin, October 7, 2015; “Confirmed Iranian Personnel Sightings in Iraq: October 2014 – October 2015,” by Andrew Haddad and ISW Iraq Team, October 3, 2015; “Warning Update: Iran and Iraqi Shi’a Militias Deploy Ground Forces in Syria,” by Christopher Kozak and Sinan Adnan, October 1, 2015. Direct press or briefing requests for Iraq expert Patrick Martin or ISIS expert Jessica Lewis McFate here.